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The reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid has to many been seen as an anomaly in the path to Turkish modernity and westernisation. Although he based his legitimacy on Islam and portrayed himself as a conservative and moderate Caliph, he never hampered or reversed the secular reforms of the early Tanzimat era. In many ways, he was a reactionary dictator under whom the reform programme vanished, condemning the empire to a gradual destruction as Europe advanced, for which he was caricatured by the Young Turks as being an autocrat who would not let the intellectual reform groups emerge. Contemporary historians have perceived him as the ‘bloody sultan’ focusing on the Armenian massacres of the 180’s, and more recent studies have in contrast shown that with his accession, many of the reforms for which the Tanzimat had been so commended for by later Ottoman and Turkish critics were continued and even progressed.
The Ottoman empire continued to implement secular reforms but used the language of Islam to gain legitimacy amongst the population � legitimacy not only to exist, but also to implement wide ranging reforms. In terms of education, law, the military, and the economy - many of the ideals of the Tanzimat period were sustained. Yet to focus solely on these continuities would be to ignore the ideological shift, in general terms, from secularism to a pro-Islamic policy which was one of the keys to Abdülhamid’s reign.
It is interesting to note that the very concept of a ‘sultan’ was at odds with the Islamic notion of authoritative caliph. The Sultans right to power was based on little other than military might, and the only way the sultanate could gain the acceptance of the religious scholars and clerics was through reverence to, and achievement of religiously ‘valued ideals’ . The determination ‘with which Ottoman sultans pursued this struggle for legitimation is one of the most consistent and intriguing themes of Ottoman history’ . The Ottomans did indeed give deference to the Islamic law, at least in principle. When practical measures needed to be taken for the survival of the state and the continuation of the dynasty both decrees and kanunames were implemented throughout history. From its creation the Ottoman state ‘existed in a permanent state of tension in relation to the Islamic heritage’ , but also from its inception the ‘Islamic devlet or ‘state’ guaranteed the survival of the Muslim institutions and ways of life’ . The complex balance sustained by the Ottoman Empire throughout its history became more strained during its later years due to the unprecedented number of military defeats suffered from the 17th century onwards. It in this context, that the pan-Islamism and the reforms of Sultan Abdul Hamid could be understood.
The era of the Tanzimat (literally re-ordering), in Ottoman history terms is employed to refer to the period of the reform between 18 and the early 1880’s. The reforms of this period were based on a basic westernising, secularising ideas as set out by the great reforming edicts the Hatt-i Sherif of Gülhane in 18, and the Hatt-i Humayun in 1856. Men such as Resid Pasha, Ali Pasha and Fu’ad Pasha were instrumental in the reforms of this period and their belief that the only way to save the Empire was through European-style reforms permeated the movement. The Imperial edicts outlined the need for equality of all Ottoman subjects, irrespective of religion and race. They also described the need to eliminate tax farming and inequalities, and to ensure justice for all subjects.
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During the Tanzimat period the state attempted to reduce the religious basis of the Ottoman Empire. The secular nature of the reforms of the Tanzimat is particularly striking “as new reforms from the secular West were superimposed on the Islamic community and non-Muslim millets. ” One of the basic ideas of the Gülhane edict was of the equality of all Ottoman subjects irrespective of religion, ethnicity or geographical location. This was linked to the attempt to encourage a spirit of Ottomansim, and loyalty to the Ottoman state.
The clearest break between the Tanzimat regime and the Hamidian era is in this general ideology of the state. “Not only was the Sultan deeply opposed to what he saw as the disruptive forces of liberalism, nationalism and constitutionalism … but he tried to counter them by emphasizing the traditional and Islamic character of his reign.4” The Tanzimat ideology of Ottomanism was thus replaced under Abdülhamid with a prominence on what has become known as pan-Islamism. This is best defined as the ideology aiming to unite all Muslims ‘to help defend them and their ways against the inroads of the west’
Abdülhamid emphasized the caliphate, more so than any of his predecessors (possibly due to the fact that since 1878, due to territorial losses the Ottoman Empire had become decidedly more Muslim than Christian in population5) He used it in foreign relations to obtain support from Muslim groups and states in central Asia especially against the Russian enemy. Pan-Islamism became a tool to attempt to ‘tie-in’ the Arab populations of the Empire, with the promotion of Islamic solidarity. If pan-Islam was a somewhat vague ideology whose impact on the unity of the Empire is difficult to ascertain, then the physical manifestation of this theory was the Hijaz railway, built for the pilgrimage between Damascus and Mecca. It demonstrated the strength of the Caliphate to motivate support and solidarity from Muslims across the world. The power of the Caliphate was particularly strong when dealing with European nations such as France and Britain given that colonial expansion had led to a great Muslim population falling under colonial rule. The fear of a Caliphal call to jihad became an effective diplomatic tool during negotiations with the great powers.
Within the histories of the late Ottoman Empire covering the reigns of Selim III (178-1807) Mahmud II (1808-18) the Tanzimat era (18-1876), and the reign of Abdul Hamid there exists an ‘inherent teleology’7, treating all reforms as steps closer to achieving westernisation and secularisation and thus ending with the mergence of the first Turkish Republic. Although the terms ‘westernisation’ and ‘secularisation’ are used interchangeably when describing the reforms of Abdul Hamid and his predecessors, they are in fact very far from the truth. Rather than upholding this ‘enormous condescension’ it should be recognised that ‘Ottoman policy was committed to creating its own solutions’8 and although the reforms were informed by a ‘very enlightened notion of progress and relied heavily on western European models’ they were mixed with a ‘strong dose of Ottoman and Islamic elements which were deemed capable of meliorating the deleterious side effects of western influence’. This fusion of modernity and tradition was chosen to protect the empire from westernisation, and was a conscious attempt that sought to discover the secrets of western victories over the Ottoman state, and it is this fusion that is little understood, ignored or even brushed aside as propaganda by the teleological approach.
The reforms of Abdul Hamid need to be analysed within the Ottoman context and not analysed in teleological approach, and although some of the reforms and practices may not give substance to the political language of Islam they do not necessarily represent a ‘concrete rational secular programme’.
He considered himself to be and was in fact a reformer, but like the men of the Tanzimat, he felt that in the context of the time democratic representation embodied in the Parliament led to delays10. Similarly to Abdul Aziz, power was kept within the palace amongst a few individuals who advised the Sultan on his policies. Outside the palace, administrative reforms continued the central theme of the Tanzimat notably that of centralisation. In 1880, the Control Commission, responsible for policing, was now made a separate Ministry of Police, and its work was extended throughout the Empire. The organisation and work of the Ministry of Police was based on the French model11. For the first time urban and rural policing was under united control, but more importantly the policing became detached and separate from the governors who controlled the provinces they worked within.
The Muharram Decree of 1881 created the Public Debt Commission. The Commission (PDC) would receive the money raised from certain taxes and would then pay off foreign and domestic debt. It was created outside the finance department of the state and the commission was composed of one delegate each from France, Netherlands, England, Germany, Italy, Austria Hungary, and the Ottoman government. The supervision of Millets was previously under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but under Abdul Hamid it was put under the Ministry of Interior, similarly the Seraskerate (not yet the Ministry of War) was given general staff and a department for separate military operations was created. Many other subordinate commissions and debarments later became fully fledged Ministries. Including the Hijaz Railroad Ministry, Ministry for Military Equipment, Accounting Council, and Property Records etc. The office of Shaik-ul-Islam was expanded to a committee and an undersecretary created to supervise the finances of Waqfs or endowments.
Under the Tanzimat, the Vilayet Law (1864) replaced the haphazard provincial governments creating a uniform system of governance, which also created elected consultative bodies representing all interests. In legal reform the Tanzimat faced to major problems, firstly they had to devise a legal system that was acceptable to both Muslims and non-Muslims as well as the Europeans, secondly the existence of the Sharia which claimed to be a complete system of law. New secular courts (Nizamiya) were created, they administered the new Commercial Code of 1841, which was an adoption of the Swiss Commercial Law, the Criminal code of 1858 was also an adoption of the French Criminal Code and in Civil Law all areas except for Personal laws were secularised. In Muslim personal law the Mejjele (which codified Hanifi personal law) was implemented.
In all these areas the Tanzimat did not abrogate the Sharia but left the Sharia only in charge of personal law. The ulama retained their rights to appoint judges and these secular reforms were initiated by the direction of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, a man who was from amongst the ulama himself and the author of many books.
Under Abdul Hamid these trends of centralisation and uniformity continued and expanded. The Ministry of Justice created by the Tanzimat, was reorganised and its scope enlarged. Its responsibilities now included the new Nizamiya courts, the appeals courts and the religious millets courts except for the Islamic courts, which remained under the authority of the shaikh-ul-Islam. More modern schools of law were introduced in 1878 to train civil servants and judges. The expansion of uniform civil laws witnessed the expansion of Nizamiya courts in far away provinces.
The Hamidian period, famous for its secrecy and repression began with reform in the legal sphere. A Ministry of Justice was established, and laws were created to regulate the Nizamiya (mixed) courts, and to govern civil procedure. There was thus an obvious continuity from the Tanzimat era as legal reforms were brought in, though largely to counteract foreign criticism of Ottoman justice. However, Abdül Hamid would become increasingly secretive and paranoid as his reign would develop. On the level of municipal government, the 1867 parliament legislation of elected councils was implemented giving non-Muslims proportional representations, this increased centralisation and uniformity was facilitated by a huge increase in telegraph lines and the railway.
‘Optimism in the transformative power of new style schooling energised the entire Ottoman political spectrum’1. The Tanzimat reformers recommended that a comprehensive education system be created for all boys and girls, and that schools were to compete with the advances of foreign or missionary schools. It was under Abdul Hamid that the education system came into being. Although the Tanzimat reformers envisaged to adapt a more French system of education, under Abdul Hamid the curriculum and the direction of the education system resembled a more modernist Islamic trend rather than a secular one. The modern schools that were created under Abdul Hamid are described within late ottoman histories as ‘secular’ therefore in Shaw and Shaw it is stated that from 188 onwards ‘public secular education expanded rapidly’14. The secular label given to schools that had expanded under Abdul Hamid were ‘at best misleading’15 in that they incorporated much from Ottoman and Islamic practices. The curriculum had large doses of Islamic teaching and further the regimented life of the school was governed by Islamic practices. In fact, Islamic and ottoman influences were integral to the schools ‘architecture, course content, calendar, and social intercourse’16, to the extent that the most recent study of the Imperial classroom suggests that the modern schools were not alien imports but actually indigenous institutions. More importantly, whereas most accounts of Ottoman education emphasise that the emergence of modern education increasingly alienated the Ulama and reduced their role in education, it seems that in Abdul Hamid’s education policies the Ulama and Islam played prominent roles. Education is an area, which can explain the anomalies in this period of Ottoman histories, in that the educational programme so enthusiastically undertaken by the Ottomans shows how modernity and Islam were fused, rather than replacing Islam with western ideals.
Railways appeared in the Empire but expanded very slowly, maybe due to financial constraints, but by and large during the Tanzimat era there was little progress in rail. When Abdül Hamid came to power there were only a few hundred miles of railway line in the Empire, and he quickly expanded the construction of railways begun in the Tanzimat. Recognising the strategic benefits of rail travel for unity within his Empire he was keen to realise them both in Anatolia and the Arab lands. In 10 work began on a railway line to connect Baghdad with Anatolia and ultimately Istanbul. These railway lines were not merely transportation systems; they were also devices for integration and central control. The Ottoman Debt Administration was happy to invest on the expansion of a railway network in the Empire and provided much financial support. The railways became synonymous with westernisation, especially after the introduction of the Orient Express and the possibility of rapid travel to Europe.
The reforms carried out under Abdul Hamid were not a part of a secular programme; rather, they were an attempt to utilise the methods of the west to attain greater centralisation. A large dose if not all the reforms carried out under Abdul Hamid were of a practical nature, in that they aimed to centralise power and create stronger institutions. The reforms to provincial governments, to the civil service, to finances are all of that nature. The legal reforms enacted under the Tanzimat clearly represented a trend towards westernisation rather than an Ottoman adaptation, however the Tanzimat attachments to the west was largely practical in nature - although they adopted western laws they did not aim to secularise the state, but to save the state, a state which continued to and increasingly was the only guarantee to the continuation of Islamic institutions.
To some extent Abdülhamids reign is the culmination of this centralising drive. However, as opposed to the focusing of power into the hands of reform minded intellectuals his reign is a good example of centralised personal rule, “power was shifted back from Porte to Palace.” Abdülhamid was an intelligent manipulator of circumstance and in the first six months of his reign he used the constitution to exile his opponent Midhat Pasha. His role as Caliph � as discussed earlier was clearly an important factor in the authority which he himself managed to achieve. Abdülhamid was strong enough to dominate the post of grand vezir, and during a six-year period of his reign some sixteen ministers filled this position as the Sultan refused to let any grand vezir become entrenched in office. The centralisation process was greatly assisted by the technological improvements such as the telegraph and railway that became more widespread throughout Abdülhamid’s reign. The bureaucracy was expanded and improved throughout Abdülhamids reign, however no longer were ministries independent they were now subservient, obedient agents of the Sultan. The centralising process begun in the Tanzimat had been perverted by Abdülhamid leading almost inexorably to an increase in the autocratic nature of the Sultanate.
Historians such as Malcolm Yapp and Lewis treat Abdul Hamid’s Islamism with cynicism. According to them, Abdul Hamid’s Pan-Islamism and use of political language of Islam stemmed from the need to unify Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, to curtail the liberals, the nationalists and reformers and restrict the encroachment of the west - in essence it was a matter of political expediency. Yapp indicates that the state policy remained wholly Ottoman, and defined it as a secular ideology. In this type of analysis the Sultan is held as the central figure and Islamism was more about the attempt by Abdul Hamid to cover his autocratic style of ruling. In essence the Islamic venire of Abdul Hamid is brushed aside as propaganda in relation to his continuation of modern reforms.
In a similar approach Karpat reconstructs the image of Abdul Hamid and attempts to save it from the despotism of orieintalists to argue that Abdul Hamid was noted for his religious character and his notion of Islam was one of progression, in effect arguing that the mix of tradition and modernity evident in Abdul Hamid’s reign is best explained by his personal conviction to Islam, further that Pan-Islamism was a motivation to protect Muslims and was the first modern progressive Islamic movement. Although Karpat’s analysis is a move away from the teleogical approach of Yapp and Lewis, his emphasis on the role of the Sultan or the role played by the Sultans personal convictions betrays many of the dynamics that created and sustained the Pan-Islamism of Abdul Hamid.
A written constitution was the last great document of the Tanzimat. Its purpose was to continue the trend towards secularism and westernisation by the establishment of an elected parliament and a democratic system, and ultimately hoping to establish the people as the sovereign power of the nation. In December 1876 the constitution was circulated and “ The constitution breathed western influence throughout.5” Abdül Hamid however was able to preserve much of the Sultanates previous power as he was still able to approve legislation, appoint ministers and could disband the chamber. Abdül Hamid thus ruled as an absolute monarch for the next three decades until the Young Turk revolution forced the Sultan to recall the Parliament. No doubt the path the Sultan was to take was against the reform-minded nature of the Tanzimat. Though undoubtedly it was a flaw within the drafting of the constitution that allowed Abdül Hamid to maintain and extend his powers.
Yapp, Lewis and to a lesser extent Karpat and Shaw all emphasise the role of the Sultan in creating or sustaining Pan-Islamism, with the chief benefactor being Abdul Hamid and the Ottoman dynasty. This suggests that Abdul Hamid was the key instigator (keeping with the idea of Oriental despotism and the Orientals inability to form social and political groups) of the policies, thus the question of reform under Abdul Hamid is answered by reconstructing his personal convictions and his political ingenuity. For Pan-Islamism to succeed the Sultan had to carry out religiously ‘valued’ deeds, supporting religious institutions, either through madrsasahs or Khanqas, by supporting Muslim causes outside the Ottoman Empire or by taking in Muslim refugees � they all benefited the Muslim population and their sentiments. Abdul Hamid’s personal conviction is not denied; rather his conviction played a similarly important role.
Abdul Hamid did indeed use the political language of Islam, however he did not implement a ‘concrete policy of rational secularism’ rather it was an attempt to utilise the best of the west and discard those that undermined or potentially could undermine Islamic culture. Pan-Islamism was not a creation of Abdul Hamid, nor was he the only benefactor. Therefore it was not merely political expediency but a policy that represented the sentiments of a large section of the Ottoman population. The Ottoman or Islamic Devlet had guaranteed the continuation of religious institutions, thus in the Muslim world where states disappeared, Muslims tried to reform society and where the state survived, the elites attempted to reform the state.
Through his emphasis on the Islamic nature of the state and his position within it, Abdül Hamid “increased the throne’s power and transformed the Sultan from a supreme executive organ, as he was regarded throughout the Ottoman Empire, into an autocratic semi-deity as Caliph”6. He continued many of the reformist policies of the Tanzimat, however as a reform movement I don’t think that the Tanzimat could have ever reached a ‘climax’. Reform is an ongoing process where policies are constantly being formed and reformed, and Tanzimat legacy continued long after the Sultan had died. The reign of Abdül Hamid wasn’t the culmination f the Tanzimat, the reform ideas made popular by the Tanzimat were continued under Abdülhamid, and were still an intellectual focus well after the time of Ataturk, when the Ottoman Empire itself was long consigned to history.
The reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid has to many been seen as an anomaly in the path to Turkish modernity and westernisation. Although he based his legitimacy on Islam and portrayed himself as a conservative and moderate Caliph, he never hampered or reversed the secular reforms of the early Tanzimat era. In many ways, he was a reactionary dictator under whom the reform programme vanished, condemning the empire to a gradual destruction as Europe advanced, for which he was caricatured by the Young Turks as being an autocrat who would not let the intellectual reform groups emerge. Contemporary historians have perceived him as the ‘bloody sultan’ focusing on the Armenian massacres of the 180’s, and more recent studies have in contrast shown that with his accession, many of the reforms for which the Tanzimat had been so commended for by later Ottoman and Turkish critics were continued and even progressed.
The Ottoman empire continued to implement secular reforms but used the language of Islam to gain legitimacy amongst the population � legitimacy not only to exist, but also to implement wide ranging reforms. In terms of education, law, the military, and the economy - many of the ideals of the Tanzimat period were sustained. Yet to focus solely on these continuities would be to ignore the ideological shift, in general terms, from secularism to a pro-Islamic policy which was one of the keys to Abdülhamid’s reign.
It is interesting to note that the very concept of a ‘sultan’ was at odds with the Islamic notion of authoritative caliph. The Sultans right to power was based on little other than military might, and the only way the sultanate could gain the acceptance of the religious scholars and clerics was through reverence to, and achievement of religiously ‘valued ideals’ . The determination ‘with which Ottoman sultans pursued this struggle for legitimation is one of the most consistent and intriguing themes of Ottoman history’ . The Ottomans did indeed give deference to the Islamic law, at least in principle. When practical measures needed to be taken for the survival of the state and the continuation of the dynasty both decrees and kanunames were implemented throughout history. From its creation the Ottoman state ‘existed in a permanent state of tension in relation to the Islamic heritage’ , but also from its inception the ‘Islamic devlet or ‘state’ guaranteed the survival of the Muslim institutions and ways of life’ . The complex balance sustained by the Ottoman Empire throughout its history became more strained during its later years due to the unprecedented number of military defeats suffered from the 17th century onwards. It in this context, that the pan-Islamism and the reforms of Sultan Abdul Hamid could be understood.
The era of the Tanzimat (literally re-ordering), in Ottoman history terms is employed to refer to the period of the reform between 18 and the early 1880’s. The reforms of this period were based on a basic westernising, secularising ideas as set out by the great reforming edicts the Hatt-i Sherif of Gülhane in 18, and the Hatt-i Humayun in 1856. Men such as Resid Pasha, Ali Pasha and Fu’ad Pasha were instrumental in the reforms of this period and their belief that the only way to save the Empire was through European-style reforms permeated the movement. The Imperial edicts outlined the need for equality of all Ottoman subjects, irrespective of religion and race. They also described the need to eliminate tax farming and inequalities, and to ensure justice for all subjects.
During the Tanzimat period the state attempted to reduce the religious basis of the Ottoman Empire. The secular nature of the reforms of the Tanzimat is particularly striking “as new reforms from the secular West were superimposed on the Islamic community and non-Muslim millets. ” One of the basic ideas of the Gülhane edict was of the equality of all Ottoman subjects irrespective of religion, ethnicity or geographical location. This was linked to the attempt to encourage a spirit of Ottomansim, and loyalty to the Ottoman state.
The clearest break between the Tanzimat regime and the Hamidian era is in this general ideology of the state. “Not only was the Sultan deeply opposed to what he saw as the disruptive forces of liberalism, nationalism and constitutionalism … but he tried to counter them by emphasizing the traditional and Islamic character of his reign.4” The Tanzimat ideology of Ottomanism was thus replaced under Abdülhamid with a prominence on what has become known as pan-Islamism. This is best defined as the ideology aiming to unite all Muslims ‘to help defend them and their ways against the inroads of the west’
Abdülhamid emphasized the caliphate, more so than any of his predecessors (possibly due to the fact that since 1878, due to territorial losses the Ottoman Empire had become decidedly more Muslim than Christian in population5) He used it in foreign relations to obtain support from Muslim groups and states in central Asia especially against the Russian enemy. Pan-Islamism became a tool to attempt to ‘tie-in’ the Arab populations of the Empire, with the promotion of Islamic solidarity. If pan-Islam was a somewhat vague ideology whose impact on the unity of the Empire is difficult to ascertain, then the physical manifestation of this theory was the Hijaz railway, built for the pilgrimage between Damascus and Mecca. It demonstrated the strength of the Caliphate to motivate support and solidarity from Muslims across the world. The power of the Caliphate was particularly strong when dealing with European nations such as France and Britain given that colonial expansion had led to a great Muslim population falling under colonial rule. The fear of a Caliphal call to jihad became an effective diplomatic tool during negotiations with the great powers.
Within the histories of the late Ottoman Empire covering the reigns of Selim III (178-1807) Mahmud II (1808-18) the Tanzimat era (18-1876), and the reign of Abdul Hamid there exists an ‘inherent teleology’7, treating all reforms as steps closer to achieving westernisation and secularisation and thus ending with the mergence of the first Turkish Republic. Although the terms ‘westernisation’ and ‘secularisation’ are used interchangeably when describing the reforms of Abdul Hamid and his predecessors, they are in fact very far from the truth. Rather than upholding this ‘enormous condescension’ it should be recognised that ‘Ottoman policy was committed to creating its own solutions’8 and although the reforms were informed by a ‘very enlightened notion of progress and relied heavily on western European models’ they were mixed with a ‘strong dose of Ottoman and Islamic elements which were deemed capable of meliorating the deleterious side effects of western influence’. This fusion of modernity and tradition was chosen to protect the empire from westernisation, and was a conscious attempt that sought to discover the secrets of western victories over the Ottoman state, and it is this fusion that is little understood, ignored or even brushed aside as propaganda by the teleological approach.
The reforms of Abdul Hamid need to be analysed within the Ottoman context and not analysed in teleological approach, and although some of the reforms and practices may not give substance to the political language of Islam they do not necessarily represent a ‘concrete rational secular programme’.
He considered himself to be and was in fact a reformer, but like the men of the Tanzimat, he felt that in the context of the time democratic representation embodied in the Parliament led to delays10. Similarly to Abdul Aziz, power was kept within the palace amongst a few individuals who advised the Sultan on his policies. Outside the palace, administrative reforms continued the central theme of the Tanzimat notably that of centralisation. In 1880, the Control Commission, responsible for policing, was now made a separate Ministry of Police, and its work was extended throughout the Empire. The organisation and work of the Ministry of Police was based on the French model11. For the first time urban and rural policing was under united control, but more importantly the policing became detached and separate from the governors who controlled the provinces they worked within.
The Muharram Decree of 1881 created the Public Debt Commission. The Commission (PDC) would receive the money raised from certain taxes and would then pay off foreign and domestic debt. It was created outside the finance department of the state and the commission was composed of one delegate each from France, Netherlands, England, Germany, Italy, Austria Hungary, and the Ottoman government. The supervision of Millets was previously under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but under Abdul Hamid it was put under the Ministry of Interior, similarly the Seraskerate (not yet the Ministry of War) was given general staff and a department for separate military operations was created. Many other subordinate commissions and debarments later became fully fledged Ministries. Including the Hijaz Railroad Ministry, Ministry for Military Equipment, Accounting Council, and Property Records etc. The office of Shaik-ul-Islam was expanded to a committee and an undersecretary created to supervise the finances of Waqfs or endowments.
Under the Tanzimat, the Vilayet Law (1864) replaced the haphazard provincial governments creating a uniform system of governance, which also created elected consultative bodies representing all interests. In legal reform the Tanzimat faced to major problems, firstly they had to devise a legal system that was acceptable to both Muslims and non-Muslims as well as the Europeans, secondly the existence of the Sharia which claimed to be a complete system of law. New secular courts (Nizamiya) were created, they administered the new Commercial Code of 1841, which was an adoption of the Swiss Commercial Law, the Criminal code of 1858 was also an adoption of the French Criminal Code and in Civil Law all areas except for Personal laws were secularised. In Muslim personal law the Mejjele (which codified Hanifi personal law) was implemented.
In all these areas the Tanzimat did not abrogate the Sharia but left the Sharia only in charge of personal law. The ulama retained their rights to appoint judges and these secular reforms were initiated by the direction of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, a man who was from amongst the ulama himself and the author of many books.
Under Abdul Hamid these trends of centralisation and uniformity continued and expanded. The Ministry of Justice created by the Tanzimat, was reorganised and its scope enlarged. Its responsibilities now included the new Nizamiya courts, the appeals courts and the religious millets courts except for the Islamic courts, which remained under the authority of the shaikh-ul-Islam. More modern schools of law were introduced in 1878 to train civil servants and judges. The expansion of uniform civil laws witnessed the expansion of Nizamiya courts in far away provinces.
The Hamidian period, famous for its secrecy and repression began with reform in the legal sphere. A Ministry of Justice was established, and laws were created to regulate the Nizamiya (mixed) courts, and to govern civil procedure. There was thus an obvious continuity from the Tanzimat era as legal reforms were brought in, though largely to counteract foreign criticism of Ottoman justice. However, Abdül Hamid would become increasingly secretive and paranoid as his reign would develop. On the level of municipal government, the 1867 parliament legislation of elected councils was implemented giving non-Muslims proportional representations, this increased centralisation and uniformity was facilitated by a huge increase in telegraph lines and the railway.
‘Optimism in the transformative power of new style schooling energised the entire Ottoman political spectrum’1. The Tanzimat reformers recommended that a comprehensive education system be created for all boys and girls, and that schools were to compete with the advances of foreign or missionary schools. It was under Abdul Hamid that the education system came into being. Although the Tanzimat reformers envisaged to adapt a more French system of education, under Abdul Hamid the curriculum and the direction of the education system resembled a more modernist Islamic trend rather than a secular one. The modern schools that were created under Abdul Hamid are described within late ottoman histories as ‘secular’ therefore in Shaw and Shaw it is stated that from 188 onwards ‘public secular education expanded rapidly’14. The secular label given to schools that had expanded under Abdul Hamid were ‘at best misleading’15 in that they incorporated much from Ottoman and Islamic practices. The curriculum had large doses of Islamic teaching and further the regimented life of the school was governed by Islamic practices. In fact, Islamic and ottoman influences were integral to the schools ‘architecture, course content, calendar, and social intercourse’16, to the extent that the most recent study of the Imperial classroom suggests that the modern schools were not alien imports but actually indigenous institutions. More importantly, whereas most accounts of Ottoman education emphasise that the emergence of modern education increasingly alienated the Ulama and reduced their role in education, it seems that in Abdul Hamid’s education policies the Ulama and Islam played prominent roles. Education is an area, which can explain the anomalies in this period of Ottoman histories, in that the educational programme so enthusiastically undertaken by the Ottomans shows how modernity and Islam were fused, rather than replacing Islam with western ideals.
Railways appeared in the Empire but expanded very slowly, maybe due to financial constraints, but by and large during the Tanzimat era there was little progress in rail. When Abdül Hamid came to power there were only a few hundred miles of railway line in the Empire, and he quickly expanded the construction of railways begun in the Tanzimat. Recognising the strategic benefits of rail travel for unity within his Empire he was keen to realise them both in Anatolia and the Arab lands. In 10 work began on a railway line to connect Baghdad with Anatolia and ultimately Istanbul. These railway lines were not merely transportation systems; they were also devices for integration and central control. The Ottoman Debt Administration was happy to invest on the expansion of a railway network in the Empire and provided much financial support. The railways became synonymous with westernisation, especially after the introduction of the Orient Express and the possibility of rapid travel to Europe.
The reforms carried out under Abdul Hamid were not a part of a secular programme; rather, they were an attempt to utilise the methods of the west to attain greater centralisation. A large dose if not all the reforms carried out under Abdul Hamid were of a practical nature, in that they aimed to centralise power and create stronger institutions. The reforms to provincial governments, to the civil service, to finances are all of that nature. The legal reforms enacted under the Tanzimat clearly represented a trend towards westernisation rather than an Ottoman adaptation, however the Tanzimat attachments to the west was largely practical in nature - although they adopted western laws they did not aim to secularise the state, but to save the state, a state which continued to and increasingly was the only guarantee to the continuation of Islamic institutions.
To some extent Abdülhamids reign is the culmination of this centralising drive. However, as opposed to the focusing of power into the hands of reform minded intellectuals his reign is a good example of centralised personal rule, “power was shifted back from Porte to Palace.” Abdülhamid was an intelligent manipulator of circumstance and in the first six months of his reign he used the constitution to exile his opponent Midhat Pasha. His role as Caliph � as discussed earlier was clearly an important factor in the authority which he himself managed to achieve. Abdülhamid was strong enough to dominate the post of grand vezir, and during a six-year period of his reign some sixteen ministers filled this position as the Sultan refused to let any grand vezir become entrenched in office. The centralisation process was greatly assisted by the technological improvements such as the telegraph and railway that became more widespread throughout Abdülhamid’s reign. The bureaucracy was expanded and improved throughout Abdülhamids reign, however no longer were ministries independent they were now subservient, obedient agents of the Sultan. The centralising process begun in the Tanzimat had been perverted by Abdülhamid leading almost inexorably to an increase in the autocratic nature of the Sultanate.
Historians such as Malcolm Yapp and Lewis treat Abdul Hamid’s Islamism with cynicism. According to them, Abdul Hamid’s Pan-Islamism and use of political language of Islam stemmed from the need to unify Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, to curtail the liberals, the nationalists and reformers and restrict the encroachment of the west - in essence it was a matter of political expediency. Yapp indicates that the state policy remained wholly Ottoman, and defined it as a secular ideology. In this type of analysis the Sultan is held as the central figure and Islamism was more about the attempt by Abdul Hamid to cover his autocratic style of ruling. In essence the Islamic venire of Abdul Hamid is brushed aside as propaganda in relation to his continuation of modern reforms.
In a similar approach Karpat reconstructs the image of Abdul Hamid and attempts to save it from the despotism of orieintalists to argue that Abdul Hamid was noted for his religious character and his notion of Islam was one of progression, in effect arguing that the mix of tradition and modernity evident in Abdul Hamid’s reign is best explained by his personal conviction to Islam, further that Pan-Islamism was a motivation to protect Muslims and was the first modern progressive Islamic movement. Although Karpat’s analysis is a move away from the teleogical approach of Yapp and Lewis, his emphasis on the role of the Sultan or the role played by the Sultans personal convictions betrays many of the dynamics that created and sustained the Pan-Islamism of Abdul Hamid.
A written constitution was the last great document of the Tanzimat. Its purpose was to continue the trend towards secularism and westernisation by the establishment of an elected parliament and a democratic system, and ultimately hoping to establish the people as the sovereign power of the nation. In December 1876 the constitution was circulated and “ The constitution breathed western influence throughout.5” Abdül Hamid however was able to preserve much of the Sultanates previous power as he was still able to approve legislation, appoint ministers and could disband the chamber. Abdül Hamid thus ruled as an absolute monarch for the next three decades until the Young Turk revolution forced the Sultan to recall the Parliament. No doubt the path the Sultan was to take was against the reform-minded nature of the Tanzimat. Though undoubtedly it was a flaw within the drafting of the constitution that allowed Abdül Hamid to maintain and extend his powers.
Yapp, Lewis and to a lesser extent Karpat and Shaw all emphasise the role of the Sultan in creating or sustaining Pan-Islamism, with the chief benefactor being Abdul Hamid and the Ottoman dynasty. This suggests that Abdul Hamid was the key instigator (keeping with the idea of Oriental despotism and the Orientals inability to form social and political groups) of the policies, thus the question of reform under Abdul Hamid is answered by reconstructing his personal convictions and his political ingenuity. For Pan-Islamism to succeed the Sultan had to carry out religiously ‘valued’ deeds, supporting religious institutions, either through madrsasahs or Khanqas, by supporting Muslim causes outside the Ottoman Empire or by taking in Muslim refugees � they all benefited the Muslim population and their sentiments. Abdul Hamid’s personal conviction is not denied; rather his conviction played a similarly important role.
Abdul Hamid did indeed use the political language of Islam, however he did not implement a ‘concrete policy of rational secularism’ rather it was an attempt to utilise the best of the west and discard those that undermined or potentially could undermine Islamic culture. Pan-Islamism was not a creation of Abdul Hamid, nor was he the only benefactor. Therefore it was not merely political expediency but a policy that represented the sentiments of a large section of the Ottoman population. The Ottoman or Islamic Devlet had guaranteed the continuation of religious institutions, thus in the Muslim world where states disappeared, Muslims tried to reform society and where the state survived, the elites attempted to reform the state.
Through his emphasis on the Islamic nature of the state and his position within it, Abdül Hamid “increased the throne’s power and transformed the Sultan from a supreme executive organ, as he was regarded throughout the Ottoman Empire, into an autocratic semi-deity as Caliph”6. He continued many of the reformist policies of the Tanzimat, however as a reform movement I don’t think that the Tanzimat could have ever reached a ‘climax’. Reform is an ongoing process where policies are constantly being formed and reformed, and Tanzimat legacy continued long after the Sultan had died. The reign of Abdül Hamid wasn’t the culmination f the Tanzimat, the reform ideas made popular by the Tanzimat were continued under Abdülhamid, and were still an intellectual focus well after the time of Ataturk, when the Ottoman Empire itself was long consigned to history.
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